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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
PETITION

vs.
HAROLD K. BEECHER &
ASSOCIATES, a Utah Corporation,
and HAROLD K.

FOR
REHEARING

BEECHER, an

Civil No.

10609

individual,

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition for rehearing involves the questions of
whether Count II of plaintiff's complaint states a valid
third party beneficiary action against defendant architect Harold K. Beecher and Associates, a Utah corporation,-an issue which the Court has not decided, and
whether Count I of plaintiff's complaint is fatally defective in failing to plead the duty of care and the breach
thereof by said defendant according to the standard of
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learning, skill and care customarily practiced by architects practicing in the vicinity where the defendant
practices?

DECISION ON ORIGINAL HEARING
This Honorable Court has decided the case against the
defendant without resolving the above two issues.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Your petitioner seeks to have the Court reason the case
on traditional contract and tort law which is the basis of
decision in the cases cited by the Court when the particular fact situations are carefully analyzed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case which should be determinative
on rehearing are: first, plaintiff did not plead that the
architect had a right or a duty to provide written specifications which would make definite the degree of sloping
and/or shoring of the temporary trench; second, no specifications of the degree of sloping or of the kind and extent
of shoring of the excavation exist in this case, which
would make definitive the method and manner of exca- 1
vation to be followed by the contractor; third, the temporary excavation was not adjacent to buildings which would
allow the application of inherently dangerous doctrine of
tort law; sixth, there was no special additional contract
for an extra fee to the architect to write out specifications
for shoring and to agree to enforce compliance with such
definite specifications; seventh, and of controlling importance, the authority, duty and manner of ordering a ,
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work stoppage, if any, by the architect's participation, is
spelled out with limitations on the architect in paragraph
13 of the architect's agency agreement with the owners
requiring not unilateral action by the architect but bilateral action by owner and architect or unilateral action
by the owners. See Exhibit "A" of Plaintiff's Complaint.
The architect has made no subscribed agreement to answer for the misfeasance of the contractor.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ARCHITECT AND ITS EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE
GRANTED THIRD PARTY IMMUNITY UNLESS THE
COURT FINDS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
AGREEMENT SUBSCRIBED BY THE ARCHITECT TO
ANSWER FOR THE MISFEASANCE OF THE CONTRACTOR WHICH THE COURT HAS NOT YET
FOUND.
Until the amendment of the Workmen's Compensation
Act of 1945, an injured workman had no third party
action. That amendment did not grant workmen on building projects a third party action for all injuries wherein a
third party might be involved. In Cook v. Kiewit Construction Company, 15 Ut. 2d 20, a case involving an alleged tort of misfeasance (not an alleged claim for passive
non-feasance), Justice Crocket interpreted the legislative
limitation on third party actions by workmen entitled to
compensation thus:
The-Statute-seems plainly designed to apply to
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers
engaged in the same endeavors.
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A reasonable view of the fact situation would seem to
compel the conclusion that here the architect was not a
stranger to the employment and that the architect and
the contractor (through and by his servants) were engaged in the same endeavor. See: Defendant's original
brief (pp. 20-27).
Fairness to the architects of Utah and the legal profession would seem to indicate that if the Court is determined to reason to its decision simply on a non-traditional, new, humanitarian, public policy argument it
should set out the reasons why it favors workmen and
penalizes architects under the particular facts of this case.
The existence or the non-existence of a third party
beneficiary action was definitely an issue in this case.
Defendant's counsel briefed the issue rather fully (Defendant's original brief, pp. 9-12 Inc.).
The opinion of the Court fails to state whether or not
the Court found that a third party beneficiary contract
exists in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel failed to
brief this issue and in effect asked the Court to find liability on the basis of some humanitarian principle rather
than on the basis of an established rule of law.
This plea was made by plaintiff even though the architect's agency agreement made it clear that the architect
did not intend to make and did not make a third-party
beneficiary contract, and even though plaintiff does not
allege that the architect is guilty of any misfeasance or
that the architect assumed a moral obligation which he
then performed in a negligent manner.
Again, if the members of the Court believe that the

,
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architect by its subscribed agreement including paragraph 13 on SUPERVISION (which the court overlooks)
intentionally and knowingly made a third party beneficiary contract to answer for the tortious defaults of the
contractor under the particular facts of this case, then the
opinion should so declare. One cannot be quite sure
whether the Court intends to hold that plaintiff's alleged
second cause of action, Count II, does or does not allege a
valid third party beneficiary agreement.
We respectfully request that the Court upon rehearing
specifically find on this issue.
POINT II
THE COURT'S OPINION COMPLETELY OVERLOOKS
THE FATAL NEGLECT AND OMISSION OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT TO PLEAD A BREACH OF DUTY
OF DEFENDANT ARCHITECT ACCORDING TO THE
STANDARD OF DUTY AND CARE GOVERNING DUTIES OF ARCHITECTS PRACTICING IN THE VICINITY WHERE THE DEFENDANT ARCHITECT PRACTICES.
Plaintiff's first and abandoned complaint pleaded on
architect's duty of care properly as follows:
That the reasonable and standard exercise of judgement and care ordinarily exercised in like cases by
reputable members of the architect's profession
practicing in the same locality would dictate that in
accordance with the duty specified in the authorized
contract the work should have been shut down until
the proper safety and precautionary measures had
been provided. (Plaintiff's original complaint pp.
2-3.)
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Plaintiff's second amended complaint omits the foregoing allegation of standard of care which is essential to
a validly pleaded complaint. It says nothing about a duty
to exercise a discretionary judgement which skilled architects practicing in the vicinity would exercise under the
circumstances. It simply alleges without reference to the
applicable legal standard of care governing architects.
That said defendants both knew said dangerous condition for many days prior to said accident and
negligently failed to shut down the work on said
tunnel as they had the duty and the authority to do.

The Paxton case, infra, (which the court erroneously
cites as supporting its opinion) approved the trial court's
instruction regarding the standard of care required of an
architect which reads in part as follows:
You are not permitted arbitrarily to set up a standard
of your own. The standard is that set up by the learning, skill and care ordinarily possessed and practiced
by others of the same profession in the same locality
at the same time. It follows, therefore, that the only
way you may properly learn that standard is through
evidence presented in this trial by other persons in
the field of architecture called as expert witnesses.
(259 P. 2d 934, 938).
The Supreme Court of Illinois in its unpublished opinion in the Miller Case, infra, observed that the complaint
properly pleaded the standard of care required of an
architect thus:
( d) otherwise negligently and carelessly failed to
apply to the work aforesaid the degree of skill which
would customarily be brought to such work by competent architects in and about this community. (p. 9.)
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A California case squarely in point on the necessity of
properly pleading an architect's duty and the breach
thereof reads:
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege a duty of the
architect according to the standard of leaning, skill
and prudence of architects practicing in the vicinity,
nor any violation of that established standard of care
by the architect or any of its agents in performance of
its supervisory duties. Bourie v. Spring Valley Water
Company, 1908, 8 Cal. App. 588, 97 P. 530.

POINT III
THE COURT FALLS INTO THE ERROR OF ENGAGING IN UNJUSTIFIABLE JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
WHERE NO INTERSTICE OR GAP EXISTS IN THE
LAW GOVERNING LIABILITY OF ARCHITECTS.
THE APPLICATION OF STARE DECISIS TO THE
PARTICULAR FACT SITUATION IN THE NAUMAN
CASE WILL PRODUCE AN OPPOSITE RESULT
FROM THAT OF THE FIRST OPINION.
Traditional law holds that an architect should not be
held liable for the wrong of a contractor unless the subscribed agreement of the architect clearly shows an intent
to answer for the contractor's default as shown in Erhart,
infra.

Counsel recognize that it is only in cases of great importance to social groups such as Utah architects and
workmen on building projects that members of the Court
can be persuaded to reconsider their legal opinions and
attempt to do so de novo. Nevertheless, reanalysis of the
fact situation (particularly paragraph 13 of the arch-
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itect's agreement) in the Nauman case is necessary in our
opinion to achieve justice. Courts sometimes do reanalyze
their opinions. This court has done so.
In Miller V. Stuart 69 Ut. 250, the Court said:
"This conclusion is at variance with what was said
upon the subject in National Bank of the Republic
V. Price 65 Ut 57 where we think this Court fell into
error."
Justice Cardozo gives the legal test for determining
whether a court has been guilty of unjustifiable judicial
legislation in coercing a group, such as architects, into
new liabilities which they did not intend to assume and
to which they did not understand that they were obligating themselves.
Justice Cardozo in The Nature of the Judicial Process,
7th ed., 1931 in Lecture III, the Judge as a Legislator pp.
103, 113-114, and 115 writes:
"We must keep within these interstitial limits which
precedent and custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of other judges through the
centuries of the common law have set to judge-made
innovations. But within the limits thus set, within the
range over which choice moves, the final principle of
selection for judges as for legislators, is one of fitness
to an end."
(p. 103)
"Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his
competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are
narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills
the open spaces in the law. How far he may go without traveling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for him upon a chart. He must learn

1
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it for himself as he gains the sense of fitness and
proportion that comes with years of habitude in the
practice of an art. Even within the gaps, restrictions
not easy to define, but felt, however impalpable they
may be, by every judge and lawyer, hedge and circumscribe his action. They are established by the
traditions of the centuries, by the example of other
judges his predecessors and his colleagues, by the
collective judgement of the profession, and by the
duty of adherence to the prevading spirit of the law."
(p. 113-114.)
"None the less, within the confines of these open
spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice
moves with a freedom which stamps its action as
creative." (p. 115.)
Counsel respectfully represent to this Honorable Court
that in this case there is no interstice or gap in the law.
The established law of third party liability of architects
to answer for the default or miscarriage of another has
been fully and well established over the last half century.
In the Paradoxes of Legal Science 1928 at Page 8, Cardozo quotes Pound as follows:
"Much of the administration of Justice says Pound,
is a compromise between the tendency to treat each
case as one of generalized type of case, and the tendency to treat each case as unique."
Cases involving the law of architects are uniformly decided on the special facts of each case as will be shown
hereinafter in distinguishing the cases cited by the Court
from the fact situation alleged in plaintiff's pleadings.
The law which applies and should be applied to the
above facts is that governing open excavations where
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there are no specifications and the work is not inherently
dangerous. The law applicable to this situation is adequately brief in defendant's original brief, Pages 16-18
citing 23 ALR 1084 in which all of the cases limit the duty
of the architect to supervision of the details as spelled out
in the drawings and specifications. Plaintiff's brief shows
no contra cases except on facts inherently dangerous.
POINT IV
THE COURT UNJUSTIFIABLY METAMORPHOSES
AN ALLEGED CONTRACTOR'S UNILATERAL CONSENT STATED IN THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
TO WHICH THE ARCHITECT IS NOT AP ARTY, INTO
A LEGALLY UNDEFINED DUTY OF THE ARCHITECT (COURT DOES NOT SAY WHETHER CONTRACT OR TORT) TO ANSWER FOR THE MISFEASANCE OF THE CONTRACTOR WHEREIN NO ARCHITECT'S SPECIFICATION WAS REQUESTED OR
MADE AS TO THE MANNER OF EXCAVATING THE
OPEN, VISIBLE TRENCH WHICH DID NOT COME
WITHIN THE TORT LAW OF AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS SITUATION.
(A) THE ARCHITECT'S POWERS OF SUPERVISION AS OWNER'S AGENT ARE EXPRESSLY LIMITED BY PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE ARCHITECT'S
OWN AGREEMENT IN PRIVITY WITH THE OWNERS
(WHICH PARAGRAPH THE COURT OVERLOOKS)
TO BE EXERCISED ONLY UNDER THE SUPERIOR
CONTROL OF THE ENGINEERS OF THE OWNERS,
AND NOT UNILATERALLY.
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(B) THE CONTRACTOR EXPRESSLY AGREES TO
PROVIDE SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR WORKMEN.
THE ARCHITECT DOES NOT. THE ARCHITECT'S
SUBSCRIBED AGREEMENT DOES NOT AGREE TO
ANSWER FOR THE DEFAULT OF THE CONTRACTOR. THE ARCHITECT'S AGREEMENT WITH THE
OWNERS CONAINS NO REFERENCE TO WORK
STOPPAGE.
It is elementary contract law that a party, in this case

the architect, should be bound only by the terms, intent
and understanding of its subscribed agency agreement
and the Court should not broaden the architect's duties
to a special unilateral duty of supervision forbidden by
paragraph 13 of the architect's agency agreement regarding a work stoppage, if any.
The Court quotes paragraphs 1 and 7 of the architect's
agreement with the owners, but completely overlooks
paragraph 13 on the specific point at issue with its express words of limitation upon the authority and duties
of the agent architect. It reads:
13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will represent the owner, Salt Lake City Corporation, with
respect to this agreement, and the Architect shall
perform and conduct all required services under his
direction and supervision and shall submit his reports
of study, drawings, design, details, specifications and
recommendations to him for City approval, as well as
all shop drawings, change orders, estimates for payment to Contractor, as required. (Italics added for
emphasis.)
The foregoing limitations of authority and enumeration
of duties requiring the Architect to "perform and conduct
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all required services under" the "direction and supervision" of the City Engineer is reinforced by paragraph
3 (b) of the General Conditions Section of the Specifications which reads in part, that the architect,
Will direct the supervision of construction and is acting in cooperation with the City Engineer and County Engineer as outlined above in paragraph 3 and
3(a). (R.148).
The Court overlooks the foregoing limitations and definitions of duty plainly spelled out in the architect's agency agreement denying any unilateral action by the Architect in any situation of claimed right to stop the work
"due to circumstances-that may be construed to be dangerous." The Court quotes a consent provision regarding
work stoppage found in the contractor's contract with the
Owners to which the Architect is not a contracting party.
It reads in part as follows:
"If, in the judgement of the Architect and/or the
City Engineer or County Engineer it is necessary to
close down the work-due to circumstances-that
may be considered to be dangerous", etc.

When paragraph 13 of the architect's agreement is laid
alongside the above conflicting consent statement in the
contractor's contract, the controlling question is,
Which should determine the architect's duty: The subscribed agency agreement of the architect with its stipulated limitations of authority and duty, or the said contractor's consent in its contract with the owners to which
the architect is not in privity?
The above question should be answered by applying
the law of agency. This means that the agent's contract

,
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must be construed against the particular fact situation. It
should be emphasized that any attempted stopping of
work of the contractor by the owners, "on the recommendation of the Architect," would require the exercise
of discretionary judgement regarding an extraordinary,
non-customary and unusual act and would create a controversia 1 situation where no definitive specifications
exist. It is elementary egency law in cases involving extraordinary action that the agent must act strictly within
the express limitations of his authority.
The law of agency requires that "effect must be given
to every word and clause of the agent's agreement.
Mechem on Agency Vol. 1, 1914, Secs. 768 and 776. A general agency to "supervise the work" or "all phases of the
work" is not an unlimited agency. Ibid., Mechem, Sec.
714. An agent cannot increase his authority and duties by
his representations to a third party, such as the contractor
in the Nauman case, that he has broader authority than
he in fact possesses under the limitations of his agency
agreement, paragraph 13. Ibid., Mechem, Secs. 755 and
757.
The Court correctly finds that
The method of construction was a matter solely
under the control of the contractor, and the defendant had no right to interfere with the contractor's
execution of the work.
However, the Court erroneously concludes that:
"The defendant had a right to insist that the work be
carried on in a safe manner." This statement is in error
because in the matter of work stoppage the agent's agree-
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ment limits the architect to "study and recommendation
to the City Engineer for City approval."
The foregoing statement of the Court on a duty of the
architect to insure a safe manner of excavation is good
law only where an inherently or intrinsically dangerous
situation exists as was the case in Miller V. DeWitt, infra,
and in withdrawal of lateral support from an adjacent
building as was true in the Erhart case, infra. In all other
situations the manner, means and method of carrying on
the work is the exclusive domain of the independent contractor, unless a clearly intended third party agreement
containing definitive specifications can be found as was
found by the special, added, architect's agreement in the
Erhart case.
The Court then completely and unjustifiably overlooks
the clearly stated terms of authority and duty of paragraph 13 of the architect's agreement, Exhibit "A". The
Court imposes a different agency contract on the architect.
The opinion reads in part:
We are of the opinion that if the defendant knew or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known
that the trench was unsafe either by reason of the
contractor's failure to properly shore the walls of the
trench or by its failure to slope the sides of the trench
in such a manner as to make the excavation a safe
place to work, the defendant had the right and the
corresponding duty to stop the work until the unsafe
condition has been remedied.
There are several things wrong with this reasoning and
conclusions:
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First: The conclusion of the Court makes an agreement
for the architect which was not intended as, and is not the
architect's agency agreement, and under the special facts
of this case is contrary to the express limitations upon the
architect's right and scope of supervision as the owner's
agent which is spelled out by paragraph 13 of the architect's subscribed agreement.
Second: In the history of contract law, discretionary
options create rights but not contract duties.
Third: The Court's newly made agreement for the
architect is impracticable of enforcement. Just suppose a
practical case which does not involve any detailed specification by the Architect.
There is then no standard of action of a definite thing
to be done by the Contractor, since there are no specifications of sloping and/or shoring specified by the architect
before the work is done. Suppose that during the excavating of the open trench the Architect says to the contractor:
"I order you to stop work, in my judgement your
combination of sloping and shoring does not provide
a safe place for workmen."
The contractor replies:
"In my judgement it is safe. You haven't made any
detailed specifications as to the manner of sloping or
shoring which I shall follow, my contract leaves that
to my discretion and judgement. I have done the excavation this way for an eighth of a mile and there
is no evidence to indicate that my present methods of
excavating are unsafe."
How will the architect enforce his supposed judgement
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about an unsafe condition? Will he have to go to a court
for an injunction? How long will it take the Court to determine whether the condition of the open trench in
which no accident has occurred and regarding which
there are no specifications is a safe or an unsafe condition
for workmen? What happens while the litigation goes on?
Are we not in no man's land of impracticability? Does not
this simple illustration demonstrate that unless there are
definitive specifications as to the manner of shoring as is
found in the Erhart Case, infra, that the Court should not
do judicial legislating in such fact situation, but should
decide the case on the traditional law governing architects? Before holding the architect in any way responsible
for the methods and procedures used by the contractor,
the Court should require definiteness of contract by requiring the existence of detailed specifications to which
the Contractor agrees to conform. This would give validity and enforceability to intended and understood contract provisions.
Historically, the architect is not responsible, but the
contractor is responsible for construction means, methods,
techniques, sequences, procedures and for safety precautions and programs in connection with the work. The
excavation of a trench is not a part of the materials to be
incorporated into the completed building and, therefore,
no specifications are provided unless a special architect's
agreement is made to define the methods to be used by
the contractor.
The architect's responsibility to the owners is only with
the materials and workmanship incorporated into the
finished building. The excavation of an open trench is
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only a preparatory step necessarily taken by the Contractor in order to place the specified materials in their
proper location.
Fourth: The Courts conclusion is in error because the
standard of care is not that of the defendant architect but
that of architects practicing in the vicinity as briefed in
POINT Ilsupra.
Fifth: The Courts conclusion is unsupportable law because in legal and practical effect it makes the architect
an insurer of all workmen on building projects who may
be injured or killed. Surely the Court will not insist that
architects must be insurers of the safety of workmen particularly where the architect has not been specially employed to prepare detailed specifications and where the
work is not inherently dangerous.
Sixth: The Court's conclusion makes the rule of res
ipsa locquitur and not that of forseeability applicable by
its decision. At what point or degree of safeness, by the
Court's theoretical and nebulous measure of safety, does
the unsafe condition of the open trench occur? In the
absence of definitive specifications as to the degree of
sloping or of the kind and extent of shoring required the
test of an unsafe condition is the condition that existed
when the accident occurred, because the accident would
not have happened unless there were an unsafe condition.
Thus the "if" conclusion of the Court uses the rejected
"but for" test of causation on the facts of this case.
Seventh: The contract without privity which the Court
makes for the architect is to answer for the default or
misconduct of the contractor and is not subscribed by the
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architect as is required by the Statute of Frauds in such
cases, and as was found in Erhart, infra.
Eighth: The Court's "if" statement of law standing by
itself is not good law because it leaves no room for honest
mistake of judgement by the architect, which the cases
regarding liability for discretionary judgement allow. See
the Paxton Case, infra, page 938 andDay V. National U. s.
Radiator Corporation 241 La. 283, 128 So. 660 upholding
this rule of allowable mistake.
POINT V
EVERY ONE OF THE APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS CITED BY THE COURT FOR SUPPORT OF ITS
HUMANITARIAN, PUBLIC POLICY VIEW WERE
DECIDED BY APPLYING THE RULE OF STARE
DECISIS. BOTH ERHART AND PAXTON WERE DECIDED ON THEIR SPECIAL FACT SITUATIONS CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S REASONING.
(A) THE ERHART CASE, INFRA, WAS DECIDED
ON AFFIRMATIVE TORT FEASANCE OF THE ARCHITECT'S AGENT, ALTHOUGH THE COURT ALSO
FINDS A SPECIAL THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACT ON THE FACTS.
(B) THE PAXTON CASE, INFRA, WAS DECIDED
ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE ARCHITECT AS
SUPERVISING AGENT TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE
WITH HIS SPECIFICATION FOR A SAFE QUALITY
OF SHEATHING (ALTHOUGH THE ARCHITECT
WAS HELD NOT LIABLE ON DEFECTIVE PLEADING).
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(C) THE MILLER V. DEWITT CASES, INFRA,
WERE DECIDED ON THE TRADITIONAL TORT DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE TORT LIABILITY WHEN
DEALING WITH AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS OR
ULTRA-HAZARDOUS FACT SITUATION EXISTING
BEFORE ANY WORK WAS DONE.
Erhart v. Hammond 232 Ark. 133, 334 S. W. 869 was

decided by a majority of two judges to 1 (2 judges not
participating). The facts and law of this case are clearly
distinguishable from and do not support the court's decision in this Nauman case, nor does the Erhart decision
depart from the traditional law of tort or contract.
The first reason why the Erhart case is not in point and
does not support the opinion in the Nauman case is that
the plaintiff in Erhart pleaded a tort action for affirmative misfeasance of defendant architects on which the
verdict for plaintiff was found to be supported by the
evidence. The Arkansas Supreme Court sets out a stipulation of the parties and part of the pleading of the architect's tort of misfeasance as follows:
The architect stipulated that "Davenport was their
agent, servant and employee and acting within the
scope of his employment on the J. C. Penney Company job site at the time of (the cave in) and prior
thereto." (Material in parenthesis added.)
The complaint in Erhart alleged "that the agent of
the architect had negligently driven a 4600 pound
vehicle onto the damp earth adjacent to the point of
cave-in contributing to the cave-in and resulting
damage and deaths."
The second reason why the Erhart case does not support this court's opinion is because the court found a spe-
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cial third party beneficiary contract to answer for the
default of the contractor if the architects failed to enforce their detailed, unequivocal specifications for shoring
of the trench, and there was an inherently dangerous
situation of temporary excavation adjacent to buildings.
The special facts in Erhart were in part, that the architects intentionally signed a second and separate contract
for "$12,000.00 additional fee over and above their architectural fee' (p. 869 supra.).
By the terms of this special contract the architects
agreed to draw up detailed specifications regarding the
shoring which the contractor must do in excavating the
temporary trench on the J. C. Penney job, "due to the
depth of the excavation and danger to adjacent buildings
and workmen". Also by the terms of the said special contract the architects expressly agreed to supervise the
method and manner of installing that shoring and to enforce the requirements of their detailed specifications.
The Arkansas Supreme court found that Erhart's complaint alleged that the specifications dictating the manner
of shoring by the contractor "were set out in some detail
in the" (special, additional) "contract." (Italics added for
emphasis.)
Erhart's complaint then alleges that the architects did
not police the contractor's method and manner of installand maintaining the shoring according to their said specifications which neglect proximately caused injury to
one and death of the other three workmen. (Italics added
for emphasis.)
We point out that Justice Ward in his dissenting opin-
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ion accurately characterized the legal nature of the architect's subscribed, special, supervisory agreement to answer for the default of the contractor.
He wrote:
The prime contractor under the terms of the contract
was specifically charged with the duties which the
majority would impose on appellants.
The factual differences which made the Erhart Case,
supra. not in point in the Nauman case are as follows:
First, there was no agreement for a special fee, or at
all, of the architect in the Nauman case to draw up written specifications for the detailed manner of shoring the
trench to be excavated.
Second, no such specifications were anticipated by anyone or made by the architect in the Nauman case.
Third, the architect in the Nauman case did not intentionally or knowingly or otherwise agree to supervise the
method or manner of the contractor's excavation of the
trench as was done by the architects in the special third
party beneficiary contract in Erhart.
Fourth, the excavation in the Erhart Case, supra, involved "danger to adjacent buildings" which does come
under the inherently dangerous tort doctrine. (Def's
original brief POINT V, Restatement of torts Sec. 520 et.
seq.) No such inherently dangerous situation is pleaded
in the Nauman Case.
Fifth, The contractor in the Nauman case did not agree
to comply with architect's specifications for the shoring
and/or sloping of the trench. In Erhart the contractor
agreed to conform to the detailed specifications for shor-
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ing the trench which the architects specially agreed to
inforce.
Sixth, in the Nauman case the manner and method of
excavation was left entirely to the discression and control
of the contractor as stated by the Court in the first sentence of the next to the last paragraph of its opinion.
This was not true in the Erhart Case. In the Nauman case
the architect did not have any unilateral option right or
duty to close down the work within its discressionary
judgement but was limited to study and make recommendation on any question of work stoppage by paragraph 13 of its agreement on supervision (entirely overlooked by the Court).
The case of Paxton v. Alameda County 119 Cal. 2d 393.
259 P. 2d 934 does not support the Court's opinion in the
Nauman case. We thought we made this point perfectly
clear in our original brief (p. 32-33). We agree with the
Paxton Case because it is reasoned on the traditional rule
that the supervisory duties of an architect are commensurate with and limited by a duty of enforcement of his
definitive specifications.
The material facts in Paxton were that the architect
had provided specifications for a safe quality of sheathing
on a flat roof that was to be later tarred and graveled.
He saw inferior sheathing stored near the building being
erected and neglected to enforce the use of safe betterq uali ty sheathing which he had specified. The architect
was held not liable because the defective pleading
charged him only with making neglegent specifications
and not with neglect to supervise and enforce his safe
specifications. The inferior sheathing used allowed a
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workman to fall through the roof from which serious
injury resulted.
A careful reading of the Paxton Case will disclose undisputably that the Court found:
First, that the specifications for roof sheathing were
safe according to the standard of architects practicing in
the vicinity or community area where the defendant
practiced and were not negligently drawn up.
Second, that the general supervision clause required
the architect only to exercise the reasonable prudence
exercised by architects practicing in the said community
area to secure safe sheathing on the roof as an end result
according to the specifications which the architect had
drafted and included in the contractor's contract. The
governing point of the law of architects which the court
completely overlooks in the Nauman case is that the specifications define the limit of duty of an architect's supervisory duties.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the Miller case, infra,
declared,
As a general rule it has been said that the general
duty to "supervise the work" merely creates a duty
to see that the building when constructed meets the
plans and specifications contracted for. Clinton v.
Boehm, 124 N.Y.S. 789, 139 App. Div. 73; Garden City
Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P. 2d 352, 356;
Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corp. 241 La. 288,
128 So. 660, 666.
It must be admitted that in both the Erhart Case and
in the Paxton Case, those Court's, by decision in the first,
and by dicta in the second (since the architect was not
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held liable in the Paxton CaseQ were founded on the traditional line of demarcation in the law of architects that
the architect is liable only for negligent failure to require
compliance with his specifications, except where the law
of a tortious misfeasance as in Erhart or the law of tort
governing an inherently or ultra hazardous situation as
in the Miller cases applies to and governs the fact situation.
The two opinions in Miller v. DeWitt, first by the intermediate appellate court in 59 Ill. app. 2nd 38, 208 N.E. 2d
249 and second in the unpublished opinion of the Illinois
Supreme Court, were properly decided on the traditional
tort doctrine of inherently dangerous situation requiring
ultra hazardous activity. This is proved by the following
quotations from the Miller opinions. The intermediate
appellate Court's analysis and conclusions were:

The particular, immediate matter which was involved was not simple, minor, unimportant, or inconsequential routine, non-vital, day to day detail. ,
The removal of the north-south proscenium truss and
the north end columns and the temporary support
stay or shoring of the west end of each of the old
four west end trusses pending installation of the proposed new north-south main bearing truss were highly important serious vital steps in the whole construction process to be done once and once only. The
west ends of those old west-east trusses had to be
temporarily supported and shored. The job could not
be accomplished without doing so. And the nature of
the particular matter involved was such that it did
not admit any of on-the job experimentation, trial
and error correction, approximations or mistakes. If
one significant mistake or miscalculation occurred in
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the adequacy of the supports, stays or shoring a collapse would inevitably occur. There could be no second opportunity to do something else. There could be
::10 rectification. The supports, stays, columns or
towers had to be correct-not about correct-and
they had to be correct the first time. There would be
no second time. The matter was inherently complex,
delicate and hazardous. (p. 286.) (Italics added.)
The Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
Here it appears that the shoring and removal of part
of the old gymnasium roof was a major part of the
entire remodeling situation and one that involved
obvious hazards. (p. 8.)
From the above quotations, the conclusion follows that
the decisions in the Miller cases rest on accepted tort
law of absolute liability in dealing with an inherently
dangerous fact situation requiring ultra hazardous activity which did not exist in the temporary, open, visible
trench in the Nauman case.
A second clear distinction is that the Court finds in the
Miller cases that the Illinois legislature had passed a third
party liability act, the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1963, ch. 48, paragraphs 60, 69) which provide a statutory imposed duty on supervising architects to require
adequate enforcement of safe shoring by the contractor in
"inherently complex, delicate and hazardous situations"
known to be such because of the inherently dangerous
situation to be dealt with by the architect (pp. 8-9). There
is no statutory imposed duty under the facts of the Nauman case.
We observe that the opinion of the Utah Supreme
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Court, without mentioning an inherently dangerous situation or a statutory imposed liability (not applicable to
the Nauman case) , adopts some of the language from the
unnecessary, obiter dicta of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Miller V. DeWitt, supra.
If there existed in the Nauman case an inherently dan-

gerous fact situation under traditional tort law and/or a
statutory liability under the workmen's compensation act
of Utah or some other statute, then the unnecessary obiter
dicta language of the next to the paragraph of the Court's
opinion would be harmless. That would be so because the
case would then be decided on proper legal grounds applied to the particular fact situation.
But we respectfully submit that the Court should give
effect to paragraph 13 of the written agreement of the
architect which was pleaded in Exhibit 1 attached to
plaintiff's complaint but overlooked by this Court. It
reads:
13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will represent
the owner, Salt Lake City Corporation, with respect
to the agreement, and the architect shall perform and
conduct all required services under his direction and
supervision and shall submit his reports of studyand recommendations to him for City approval.
(Italics added.)

A third material and controlling difference between the
facts of the Nauman Case and the Miller v. De Witt Case,
supra, is the difference in the language of the agency
agreements of the respective architects. In paragraph 1
of the architect's agreement in the Miller Case is found
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only a general agreement for "supervision of the work."
The architect's agreement in that case does not contain a
special contractual statement of limitations upon the authority and duties of the architect in the matter of "SUPERVISION" as is found in paragraph 13 specially dealing with that subject in the Nauman case. As stated
earlier that agreement places clearly stated limitations
upon the scope of authority and upon the duties of the
architect in supervision of the extraordinary and noncustomary act of a work coppage, if any.
POINT VI
THE CONTRACTOR'S CONSENT TO THE OWNERS
AND /OR THE OWNER'S AGENT ARCHITECT FOR A
WORK STOPPAGE IS STATED TO BE DISCRETIONARY IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE PERSONS
NAMED. THIRD PARTY CONSENT CANNOT LEGALLY CHANGE THE LIMITATIONS ON THE ARCHITECT'S DUTIES REGARDING ANY WORK STOPPAGE.
PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE ARCHITECT'S AGENCY
AGREEMENT EXPRESSLY RESTRICTS THE ARCHITECT TO STUDY AND A DISCRETIONARY RECOMMENDATION TO THE OWNERS, WHO MAY THEN
ACT OR NOT TO STOP THE WORK IN THEIR DISCRETION AND JUDGEMENT. AN HONEST MISTAKE
OF JUDGEMENT DOES NOT CREATE LIABILITY.
Traditional construction of contracts and also of third
party consent paragraphs where there is no privity of
contract would require that all of the material phrases be
given their due weight to determine the intent and rights
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and duties of the contracting parties.
Assuming for sake of argument, without admitting that
a third party consent without contract privity may override the architect's paragraph 13 on SUPERVISION. It
is one thing to allow plaintiff's attorney Donn E. Cassity
to impose a judgement upon the defendant architect to
close down the work by use of the general term "hazardous", and another thing entirely for the court to hold to
established law, that if architects practicing in the vicinity would have made a judgement that the work should
be closed down, and the defendant architect failed to
make such a recommendation to the owners as required
in his agreement, paragraph 13, then a legal basis for
liability might be found.
The cases hold that where discretionary judgement is
allowed, honest mistake of judgement does not create
liability.

The Paxton case, supra, states of the architect's specifications for sheathing
These computations he made in compliance with actual building law and in accordance with the standards of good practice in his profession and his community. That we think would negative any basis for
a finding of negligence even if he had made some
mistakes in his computation and there is no evidence
he made such mistakes. (p. 938.) (Italics added.)
The case of Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corporation
241 La. 288 128 So. 660 grants immunity from liability of
public officers and architects acting on a public project
where invested with discretionary judgement, unless the
plaintiff pleads "willfulness, malice or corruption in the
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conduct of the owner or architect."
From the foregoing law on discretionary judgements,

it appears that the Court errs in its too broadly stated

sentence in the next to the last paragraph of the Courts
opinion, to which Justice Henroid dissents. That questioned statement of law precludes non-liability for an
honest mistake of a discretionary judgement. We believe
the court inadvertently overlooked the law governing
non-liability for honest mistake of judgement and should
declare that law applicable on rehearing.
The direct and primary cause of the alleged accident is
the negligence of the Contractor clearly assumed by him
in his subscribed contract. Any alleged negligence of the
architect is of secondary or passive nature-failure to
detect negligence of contractor and recommend work
stoppage to the owners if that be his honest discretionary
judgement.

CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis supports the following conclusions:
First, The opinion is much too short to properly consider the applicable law of architects against the particular background of the instant fact-situation as is done by
all the cases cited by the Court.
Second, The immunity from liability granted to third
parties by the 1945 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act should be applied to defendant architect
unless the architect made a third party beneficiary contract waving that immunity. The Court should find no
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such third party beneficiary contract.
Third, The Court erred in failing to hold that the com.
plaint was fatally defective on the ground that the complaint did not plead a customary duty and failure to
exercise the standard of care in the matter of discretionary work stoppage by architects practicing in the vicinity
where the question of liability of the architect was involved.
Fourth, The Court engaged in unjustifiable judicial
legislation because under the particular facts and applicable traditional law there are no intersticies or gaps
to be filled in by the Court.
Fifth, The Court imposes upon architects and private
and municipal property owners engaged in building projects the unjustibiable position of insurers of all workmen
against injury and the heirs of workmen against death of
workmen by misfeasance of the building contractor. This
unjustifiable result is founded on unnecessary obiter dicta
of the Illinois appellate opinions in Miller V. DeWitt,
supra, which case was decided on the accepted tort doctrine of inherently dangerous situation requiring ultrahazardous activity, and upon a statutory imposed duty by
the Illinois Structural Work Act of 1963.
Sixth, The Court erred in failing to recognize the express terms of limitation upon the architects supervisory
activities spelled out in paragraph 13 of the architect's
agency agreement which the Court overlooks, although
pleaded in Exhibit "A" of plaintiff's complaint, which requires the discretionary judgement of the City Engineer
as to whether the contractor's work should be stopped on

31
study and recommendation of the architect, or on the
owners own initiative.
Seventh, The architect should not be bound to answer
for the default or misconduct of the contractor except
upon the written contract subscribed by the architect
coming within the statute of frauds or upon established
tort law as found in the Erhart and Miller cases.
Eighth, The cases cited by the Court were each one decided upon traditional legal grounds of the law of architects. The Paxton and Erhart cases were decided by applying the general rule of law that a general agreement
of an architect to become the supervising agent of the
owner requires only that the architect enforce his definitive specifications and also by the application of the applicable tort law governing misfeasance of an architect's
servant in Erhart.
Ninth, The Court's opinion does not allow an honest
mistake of judgement by the architect in his study and
recommendation to the City Engineer, on any work stoppage, which is allowed by the traditional law of architects.
Tenth, The decision in the Nauman case makes the
architect the unlimited insurer of the safety of all workmen who are injured or killed on construction work,
created by acts or omissions of the contractor whose liability for injuries or death is limited by Workmen's
Compensation Laws. The obligations of an insurer should
not be imposed by judicial decision.
WHEREFORE we respectfully submit that upon rehearing and reconsideration, the Court should apply tra-
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ditionally established law of architects to the unique facts
of the Nauman case.
Done this

1:l.
:lt>-

day of May, 1967.
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